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Introduction 
As researchers and policy-makers confront the challenges of and opportunities for 
improving natural resource management, increasing attention is being given to the 
dynamics of coupled natural-human systems (Liu et al. 2007).  Interdisciplinary study of 
these coupled systems has generated considerable research and management 
innovations.  Among these are more intensive research of the emergence and behavior 
of local institutions and consideration of the potential for voluntary and/or collaborative 
approaches to supplement conventional natural resource policy and management 
approaches.  Front and center in this line of research are studies of local institutional 
responses to common pool resource management issues.  Over time, this productive 
line of research is encouraging greater integration of insights across social science fields 
and identification of systematic patterns in research findings (e.g., Ostrom 1990, 1998, 
2005, Lubell et al. 2002, Imperial 1999, Sabbatier et al. 2005, among others).  
 Local institutions have successfully addressed natural resource management issues, 
including management of fisheries, irrigation systems, forests and watersheds (Ostrom 
1990, 2000, 2003, North 1990, Lubell et al. 2002, Imperial 1999, among others).  Our 
examination builds on this past research of common pool resource (CPR) management 
and draws from theories from collective action theory, institutional rational choice, the 
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, and transaction cost economics.  
We focus on lake associations and investigate the extent to which these theories explain 
the distribution of lake associations across Maine and the success of these lake 
associations in addressing five lake management issues.  We explore the utility of jointly 
modeling the presence/absence of a local institution and the management success of 
these local institutions.   
The primary research objective of this analysis is to develop an integrated empirical 
modeling framework of lake association presence (formation) and lake management 
success.  To fulfill this objective, we examined the relative performance of empirical 
econometric models that ignore and address potential sample selection bias.  Because 
we only observe measures of lake association management success on lakes that have 
a lake association, the sample is non-random.  In our empirical work, entry into the lake 
association management success sample is further complicated by our reliance on 
survey data to describe management behavior and performance.   A broad secondary 2 
 
research objective is to continue exploring the extent to which the Institutional 
Development Analysis (IAD) framework (Ostrom 1990, 1999, 2000, 2005 Lubell et al. 
2002, Sabatier et al. 2005) can be used to study Maine lake associations (Snell 2009).  
We view this IAD framework as an inclusive theoretical and empirical framework, 
accommodating insights from institutional economics, rational choice, transaction cost 
economics, and collective action theory.   
Using data from the lake-rich state of Maine, we used discrete regression analysis to 
examine empirically whether the distribution and management success of lake 
associations are consistent with the IAD framework.  We collected data describing 2,602 
lakes, including descriptions of resource, community, institutional, and lake association 
characteristics.  We employed binary probit regression analysis to explain the 
presence/absence of lake associations as a function of resource, community, and 
institutional characteristics.   We estimated ordered probit models to explain variation in 
management success for a subset of lake associations as a function of these 
characteristics as well as organization attributes; we consider water quality, invasive 
plant, recreation, development, and road management issues.  The diversity of these 
five management issues allows us to compare and contrast patterns in success.  We 
estimated a sample selection model that combines the binary probit model of presence 
and the ordered probit model of management and explicitly simulates entry into the lake 
management success sample (Greene 2002).   
Our investigation of an integrated model of lake association presence and management 
success points to future research opportunities.  Given our available data, we estimated 
the integrated model accounting for sample selection.  At present, we find little evidence 
of empirical gain from this alternative modeling approach.  Our empirical results suggest 
resource, community, and institutional factors explain the distribution of 
(presence/absence) lake associations consistent with expectations of the IAD 
framework.   The empirical models of lake association management success are less 
robust.  We are hesitant to generalize based on our current empirical findings.  Our 
treatment of management success is constrained by our limited information describing 
management and organizational attributes (e.g., sample size < 150).   This empirical 
challenge is guiding future data collection plans. 3 
 
Lake Associations and Lake Management 
 Lake associations are an interesting class of resource-based organizations.  These 
local, lake-centered institutions strive to address management issues using informal and 
voluntary strategies (Gabriel and Lancaster 2004, Kramer 2007, Kreutwiser 1986).  Lake 
associations are most common in lake-rich states, including Minnesota, Michigan, 
Wisconsin, New York, New Hampshire and Maine.  The objectives of these groups vary 
from narrow (private road maintenance) to broad (watershed health).  Lake associations 
allow for lake-centered boundaries including multiple jurisdictions, provide a voice to 
seasonal property owners, and resolve some issues related to coordination, property 
rights, and transaction costs (Gabriel and Lancaster 2004, Kramer 2007, Kreutwiser 
1986).  Over the course of the last century, lakeshore residents in some communities 
have formed local organizations with lakes as the center of attention, while other 
communities have relied on more traditional top-down management to control nonpoint 
source pollution, protect water quality and regulate recreation. Though these local 
organizations do not often have regulatory power, they frequently work to protect 
ecological and social aspects of lake ecosystems through efforts in education, lobbying 
and collaboration with governments and stakeholders.   
Lakes are valuable ecological, social, and economic assets (Carpenter and Brock 2004, 
Carpenter and Folke 2006, Wilson and Carpenter 1999, Bingham et al 1995, Boyle et al. 
1997, Boyle et al. 1999, Burt and Brewer 1971, Carson and Mitchell 1993, Caulkins 
1986, Loomis and Feldman 2003, Needleman and Kealy 1996, Kinnell et al. 2006, 
Lansford and Jones 1995).  Maintenance and management of these assets have 
evolved over time in response to scientific advances in the understanding and changing 
of threats to lake ecosystems (Allan et al. 2008, Borre et al. 2001).  For example, after 
decades of focus on point sources of water pollution, recent policies and research focus 
on managing nonpoint sources of water pollution (Borre et al. 2001, Carpenter et al. 
1998, Dodds et al. 2009, Wamelink et al. 2007, Smith 2003).   Threats posed by the 
introduction of non-native invasive plants and fish are also receiving increased attention 
by researchers, policy-makers, and citizens. Such introductions can disrupt lake 
ecosystems and prove extremely costly to manage (Halstead et al. 2003, Pimentel et al. 
2000). Nonpoint source pollution and invasive plants and fish are difficult to regulate 
because pollution sources and dispersal mechanisms are difficult to isolate and monitor.  
Furthermore, contributions to ultimate pollutant loadings and invasions are complex, 4 
 
characterized by significant heterogeneity and uncertainty over time and space. Local 
level voluntary organizations, such as lake associations, may provide an opportunity to 
address these issues.  
Nationally, lakes and ponds cover 16.45 million hectares.  These lakes provide 
numerous services including drinking water, habitat and recreation. Sixty-four percent of 
monitored lakes are impaired so that they are not suitable for one or more of their 
designated uses (e.g. recreation, agriculture, drinking water)—most often due to 
nonpoint source pollution, with nutrients, metals, and siltation of primary concern (US 
EPA 2004).  The inadvertent introduction of non-native plants and other organisms 
presents an additional threat to water quality by clogging channels and threatening 
biodiversity. Research estimates that aquatic weeds account for 10 million dollars of 
damages per year and cost an additional 100 million dollars annually to control. Invasive 
fish costs account for 54 million dollars each year (Pimentel et al. 2005, Knowler and 
Barbier 2004). These environmental problems have a number of economic implications 
including a decrease in property values as well as recreational revenues (Boyle et al. 
1997, Boyle et al. 1998, Schuetz et al. 2001, Carson and Mitchell 1993, Halstead et al. 
2003, Desvouges et al. 1983, Pimentel et al. 2005).  
Federal, state and municipal regulations address, to some extent, the threats to 
ecological quality from nonpoint source pollution and non-native species.  However, 
comprehensive lake management success may depend on greater changes in individual 
behaviors and consideration of interactions between ecological, social, and economic 
aspects of lake systems (Wooley and McGinniss 2002, Veda et al. 2008, Snavely and 
Tracy 2002, Pretty 2003).  Local institutions, such as lake associations, are well suited to 
complement traditional regulatory approaches because the strong connections and 
relationships developed through these organizations allow for more detailed knowledge 
of the sources of potential problems as well as greater support for local monitoring and 
enforcement (Ostrom 2000, Wooley and McGinniss 2002, O’Neil 2005, Mullen and 
Allison 1999, Kramer 2007, Koehler and Koontz 2008, Klyza et al. 2006, Kellert et al. 
2000, Evans 1996, Burger and Booyson 2006, Ballet et al. 2007). These relationships 
can aid in the spread of information and develop trust between community members. In 
addition, these organizations are able to address issues that state and local 
governments are not well suited to tackle. For example, issues that are difficult to 5 
 
quantify and track at a state scale, such as changes in lake character or loss of 
remoteness, are more easily observed at a local scale. 
Arguably, the presence of lake associations throughout the U.S. suggests that federal, 
state, and municipal regulations are falling short in terms of meeting some management 
objectives.  The management issues of lakes are interconnected and complex.  
Boundary issues, social dynamics, and properties of lake services account for much of 
this complexity.  Lakes and their watersheds do not follow typical political boundaries. 
Management is complicated by the fact that many lakes are located in more than one 
jurisdiction. One part of a lake could be managed by one town, while another part is 
managed by a different town.  This same lake could also cross a state or international 
border.  Furthermore, lakes often serve as the anchor of seasonal communities.  
Seasonal residents who own lakeshore housing often do not have local political power 
but have strong feelings about lake management.   
Lastly, depending on the use of the lake, it can be viewed as either a public good or a 
common pool resource (CPR). A public good is both non-excludable and non-rival, 
meaning there is open access to the good, and use of the good by one person does not 
influence use by others.  Lakes as scenery or part of an ecosystem could be considered 
a public good. A lake could also be considered a common pool resource. A common 
pool resource is non-excludable and rival, in that access is open and use of a resource 
decreases the amount of resource available or the quality available for others to use.  
Lakes used for drinking water or recreational resources fall in this category, as do 
fisheries and the elusive properties of remoteness and solitude found at lakes.  Both 
public goods and CPRs are prone to market failure, because of poorly defined property 
rights, difficulty in enforcement, high transaction costs and imperfect information.  
Organizations and institutions, such as lake associations, can help overcome these 
problems by reducing transaction costs associated with management and aiding the 
spread of information (Ostrom 2000).  
   6 
 
Conceptual and theoretical framework 
 
The collective action theory/institutional economics literature offers the overarching 
framework and provides the theoretical context for our empirical research.  Prior 
empirical research on the formation and distribution of institutions to protect natural 
resources presents valuable guidance on the design of our empirical analysis of lake 
associations.  We give particular emphasis to empirical work focused on water-based 
institutions, including lake and watershed associations (Kramer 2007, Kruetwiser 1986, 
Gabriel and Lancaster 2004, Lubell et al. 2002, Lubell 2004a , Lubell 2004b, Sabatier et 
al. 2005, White et al. 1995, Sarker et al. 2008, Michaels et al. 2006, McGinnis et al 1999, 
Koehler and Koontz 2008, Leach 2006, Leach and Pelkey 2001, Bidwell et al. 2006, 
Blomquist and Schlager 2005, Bonnell and Koontz 2007, Chess and Gibson 2001, Clark 
et al. 2005, Cline and Collins 2003, Curtis et al. 2002, Duram and Brown 1999, Ferreyra 
et al. 2008, Ferreyra and Beard 2007, German and Hailemichael 2008, Hodge and 
McNally 2008, Impierial and Kaunekis 2003, Impierial 1999,  Koontz and Johnson 2004, 
Leach et al. 2002, Low and Randhir 2005, Michaels 2001, O’Neil 2005, Oliver 2001, 
Wooley et al. 2002, Wooley and McGinnis 1999). These studies apply ideas related to 
institutional rational choice theory and the Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) 
Framework to explore factors relating to organizational formation and management 
success. 
 
Collective action theory 
Collective action theory, including the IAD framework, is applied extensively to explore 
systematic patterns in organizational formation and success (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 
2005, Lubell 2002, Sabatier et al 2005, among others).  The IAD framework incorporates 
research from many disciplines in studying the formation and change of institutions and 
organizations (Ostrom, 1990).  As noted previously, we take a broad view of this 
framework.  The IAD framework’s  “action arena” both influences and is influenced by 
human interactions. Attributes of the natural resource, the community in which the 
resource is located in, the institutional setting, and attributes of these institutions and 
organizations are central to understanding the formation and success of institutions 
(Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 1999, Ostrom 2005, Lubell et al. 2002, Sabatier et al 2005, 
Kopelman et al. 2002). 
 7 
 
Defining organizational success is challenging because associations address a number 
of issues, many of which are difficult to measure. Yet, the definition of success is central 
to management, organization, and institutional studies, determining which organizations 
are deemed successful and which organizations fall short of their goals (Koontz and 
Johnson 2004, Conley and Moote 2003, Ferreyra and Beard 2007, Leach 2002).  Some 
researchers feel that improvement in measurable environmental outcomes, such as an 
improvement in water quality, should play a prominent role in the definition of success 
(Ferreyra and Beard 2007, Imperial 1999, Koontz and Thomas 2006, Kramer 2007, 
Mullen and Allison 1999). Others feel that emphasis should be placed on connections 
formed by the organization (Ballet et al. 2007, Bidwell et al. 2006, Borre et al. 2001, 
Ferreyra and Beard 2007, Goldman et al. 2007, Koontz and Thomas 2006, Leach 2002, 
Lubell 2004b, Michaels 2001, Mullen and Allison 1999, Rultan 2008).  Organizations can 
be viewed as a success if they are enduring (Poteete and Ostrom 2008, Santos et al. 
2008, Sethi and Somanathan 1996, Clark et al 2005, Ostrom 1990, 1999, 2005), or 
organizations can be considered successful if they are able to change attitudes or 
behavior (Conley and Moote 2003, Cline and Collins 2003, Leach 2006, Moore 2003).  
Several studies provide support for the argument that a combination of social and 
biological outcomes is necessary to create a more realistic picture of success (Allen 
2008, Bidwell 2006, Woolley et al. 1999, Kellert et al. 2000, Koontz and Thomas 2006, 
2004, Leach 2002, Mullen and Allison 1999, Lubell 2004a).  Another challenge in 
defining success is determining measurable indicators of success. Surveys can capture 
information members’ perception of organizational success. Perceived success can 
serve as an indicator of some types of success, especially social success, where data 
are lacking (Lubell et al. 2002, Ferreyra and Beard 2007, Leach et al. 2002, Conley and 
Moote 2003).  Conley and Moote (2003) found that environmental success is best 
judged from an objective source outside the organization, while social success is best 
judged by members of the organization.  
 
Collective action theory (Ostrom 1990, 2005, Lubell 2002b, 2004, Leach and Sabatier 
2005) suggests four categories of factors influence the costs and benefits of 
management, and in turn, the returns to formation and the relative success of lake 
associations: resource characteristics, community characteristics, institutional 




Natural resource attributes affect both the costs and benefits of management strategies. 
Different types of management responses to resource problems have varying probability 
of success, benefits, and costs. For example, problems that are easily identifiable with 
results that are easily measurable reinforce the formation of organizations (Chess and 
Gibson 2001). Dispersed resources that cover a larger area are more costly to manage 
(Ostrom 2005).  Resources facing a serious environmental threat also encourage 
organization formation (Lubell et al. 2002). In order for the time and effort of 
organizations and institutional development to be beneficial, the resource must be 
perceived as scarce, limited or valuable, and community members must recognize at 
least the potential for problems (Ostrom 2005).  
 
Resource or environmental conditions can encourage or discourage success by 
influencing the cost of management. Some environmental problems are easier to solve 
than others (Kellert et al. 2000, Ostrom 2008, Chess and Gibson 2001).  In addition, 
smaller or more stationary resources are easier to manage, ceteris paribus. Situations 
where enforcement and monitoring costs are low encourage the success of collective 
management (Ostrom 1990, 2003). Empirical findings of lake studies are mixed:  Kramer 
(2007) found the expected negative relationship between organization success and the 
size of the lake, while Gabriel and Lancaster (2004) found no significant relationship 
between size of the lake and success of the lake association.   
 
Community Attributes 
A number of community attributes may encourage local level resource management. 
Organization participation is more likely when individuals are: dependent on a resource, 
share a common understanding with other participants, have a low discount rate, and 
have experience with other local level organizations (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 2005). 
Communities who depend on the resource for a large percentage of income have more 
motivation to successfully manage the resource (Ostrom 2005, Ostrom 1999, Ostrom 
1990). These communities would receive more benefit from protecting a resource than 
communities who do not rely on the resource.  
 
In contrast, some communities may face higher costs because of lake protection efforts.  
For example, Lubell et al. (2002) found that strong agricultural lobbies discourage the 9 
 
formation of watershed associations. Members of this lobby feared that the associations 
might encourage regulations that increase operating costs.  Communities, who depend 
on forest and agricultural industries, frequent targets of water quality programs, may 
have similar concerns about lake management policies.   
 
Homogeneity is a controversial subject within CPR research. Lubell et al. (2002) 
illustrated that partnerships are more likely to form in homogenous areas with high 
human, social and financial capital. Transaction costs are lower if members come from 
similar backgrounds and share common beliefs, values and attitudes. This relates to the 
concept of social feasibility (Chess and Gibson 2001, Allan and Curtis 2008, Sabattier et 
al. 2005). Ostrom (2005) conversely noted that homogeneity is not a necessary feature 
for collective management arrangements to occur.  Moreover, organizations and 
institutions may be established precisely to overcome transaction costs caused by 
heterogeneities. Wagner and Fernandez-Gimenez (2008) found that the large number of 
community based resource management groups in their study area was due to a high 
degree of conflict between users.  This suggests that though collaboration might be 
easier in homogeneous groups, it can be used to overcome problems caused by 
heterogeneity.  Lake communities are made up of both year-round and seasonal 
residents. These groups have different interests and relationships, which could influence 
the success of the organization. Lake associations could include members from both 
groups, or be predominantly made up of one or another. There is debate as to the effect 
of group heterogeneity on the probability of success.  As mentioned above, diverse 
stakeholder representation encourages success, but heterogeneity can increase 
transaction costs and decrease trust. Empirical evidence is mixed, with some research 
finding a significant negative relationship (Lubell 2004, Leach et al. 2002) and others 
finding no association (Poteee and Ostrom 2004, Ostrom 2005).   
 
Traits of the local community can influence the success of the organization (Chess and 
Gibson 2001, Lubell 2004b, McGinnis et al. 1999, Ostrom 2003). Research indicates 
that the size of the community strongly influences the viability of organizations (Olson 
1965 Lubell 2004a, Ostrom 1999 Gabriel and Lancater 2004).  Though coordination is 
more difficult in larger groups and benefits of the actions must be spread among more 
people, larger groups also bring greater resources to address problems.  In addition, 10 
 
greater participation can imply the development of greater social capital, which can 
reduce transaction costs associated more people (Kramer 2007).   
 
Education and income levels have also been shown to influence positively the success 
of organizations (Leach and Pelkey 2001, Koehler 2008, Cline and Collins 2002). Those 
with higher income may have more resources to commit to the organization. Education 
has been shown to positively influence the participation in volunteer organizations 
(Koehler 2008). However, Kramer (2007) did not find a significant relationship for either 
factor in his analysis of lake association success.  
 
Institutional Factors 
Institutions are referred to as the rules society members follow (North 1990, Ostrom 
1990). These can be both formal and informal and are included within the concept of 
social capital or the shared ideas, norms and beliefs of a community. Social capital 
reduces transaction costs associated with resource management. Olson (1965) noted 
that social sanctions and rewards can act as the necessary incentives to encourage 
collective action, though these are more important in larger organizations. Like other 
forms of capital, social capital can be used to obtain necessary resources (Coleman 
1986, Woolcock 1998, Woolcock and Narayan 2000, Wagner and Fernandez-Gimenez 
2008). Social capital is recursive: it encourages group participation and group 
participation encourages social capital (Kramer 2007, Coleman 1988, Woolcook 1998, 
Ostrom 1990, 1999, 2005).  Communities with a history of local level organizations or 
clubs may be more likely to form additional organizations. 
 
Lubell et al. (2002) argued that though traditional “command and control” or top-down 
systems work well in some communities, other strategies would be more attractive in 
areas where these approaches have been less successful. Support from state and local 
government encourages such activity (Leach and Pelkey 2001). Local associations that 
form around a resource instead of along political lines reduce transaction costs caused 
by coordinating across multiple jurisdictions. As a result, organizations may be more 
likely to form around resources that cross multiple jurisdictions.  Organizations may form 
in areas where no clear, consistent or effective management exists (Ostrom 1990, 2005, 
Lubell 2004, North 1990). 
 11 
 
Research has found that social capital encourages success in local level natural 
resource management (Kramer 2007, Klyza 2006, Leach 2006, 2001, Lubell 2004, 
Wagner, McGinnis 1999, Ostrom 1990, 2003, 2005, Michaels 2001). Ostrom (1990, 
2003) noted that shared norms and values encourages collective action and allows 
organizations to persist. If a community has a history of collaboration, new endeavors 
are more likely to succeed (Michaels 2001).  Social capital encourages a sense of 
community in which members are more willing to work together (Woolcook 2000). In 
their comparative study, McGinnis et al (1999) noted that a lack of a sense of community 
could have contributed to the failure of the San Ynez Watershed Association.  
Broad stakeholder participation has been identified as a key to organizational success.  
Stakeholders should represent all interested parties (Koontz and Johnson 2004, Imperial 
1999, Michales 2001, Lubell 2004b, O’Neil 2005, Veda et al. 2008, Leach 2001, Mullen 
and Allison 1999). This can include government officials, local residents, or those who 
use a resource.   Stability within the group of participants increases the chances for 
success (Ostrom 2003).   
 
Organizational factors  
Attributes of the organization can also influence the likelihood of success (Kellert et al. 
2000). Successful organizations have strong, motivational leaders who are accountable 
to the membership of the organization (Leach 2001, O’Neil 2005).  An organization's 
leadership and legitimacy are reinforced if both the leaders and members are 
accountable, and the decision making process is viewed as fair (McGinnis et al. 1999, 
O’Neil 2005). Social capital literature suggests that older lake associations are more 
likely to be successful because they may be more accepted within the community 
(Leach and Sabatier 2005, Leach and Pelkey 2001, Kramer 2007).  These organizations 
may have established trust and other relationships between community members. 
Empirical evidence is mixed as to the role organizational size plays in the level of 
success obtained.  Transaction costs are greater when more people are evolved 
(Ostrom 1990, Barker et al 1984). However other research has found larger 
organizations are more successful (Leach and Pelkey 2001).  With a larger membership, 
personal costs could be lower.  This could reduce member fatigue.  
 
Successful groups also have a clear scope of focus (Chess and Gibson 2001, O’Neil 
2005).  This focus can lead to a more efficient allocation of resources and more targeted 12 
 
fundraising. Research has shown that an organization is more likely to be successful if it 
pays more attention to an issue (Chess and Gibson 2001, Leach 2001).  Research has 
found that reliable funding and resources encourages success of local organizations 
(Leach 2001, Mullen and Allison 1999, O’Neil 2005 Coleman 2009).   
 
Water-based Institutions 
Our analysis benefits from prior research of lake and watershed associations (e.g., 
Kramer 2007, Kreutwiser 1986, Gabriel and Lancaster 2004, Lubell et al. 2002, Lubell 
2004, Lubell 2004, Sabatier et al. 2005, White et al. 1995, Sarker et al. 2008, Michaels 
et al. 2006, McGinnis et al. 1999, Koehler and Koontz 2008, Leach 2006, Leach and 
Pelkey 2001, Bidwell et al. 2006, Blomquist and Schlager 2005, Bonnell and Koontz 
2007, Chess and Gibson 2001, Clark et al. 2005, Cline and Collins 2003, Curtis et al. 
2002, Duram and Brown 1999, Ferreyra et al. 2008, Ferreyra and Beard 2007, German 
and Hailemichael 2008, Hodge and McNally 2008, Imperial and Kaunekis 2003, Koontz 
and Johnson 2004, Leach et al. 2002, Low and Randhir 2005, Michaels 2001, O’Neil 
2005, Oliver 2001, Wooley et al. 2002, Wooley and McGinnis 1999). These prior studies 
apply ideas consistent with the IAD framework to explore different aspects of these 
organizations.   
 
Lake and watershed associations have much in common: they are concerned primarily 
with water quality, and a lake association may also be a watershed association or 
eventually evolve into a watershed association. More research has focused on formation 
of watershed organizations than lake associations (Lubell 2004, Sabatier et al. 2005, 
White et al 1995, Sarker et al. 2008, Michaels et al. 2006, McGinnis et al 1999, Koehler 
and Koontz 2008).  Research of watershed organizations has focused on research 
questions addressing formation (Lubell et al. 2002, Lubell 2005, Sabitier et al 2005, 
Santos et al. 2008), organization (Leach and Pelkey 2001, Bidwell et al. 2006, Clark et 
al. 2006, Curtis et al. 2002, Duram and Brown 1999, Ferreyra and Beard 2007, Koehler 
and Koontz 2008, Koontz et al. 2004, Lubell et al. 2002, McGinnis et al. 1999, Michaels 
1999, Wooley and McGinnis 1999) and success (Lubell et al. 2002, Lubell 2004, Lubell 
2005, Sabitier et al 2005, Bonnell and Koontz 2007, Chess and Gibson 2001, Cine and 
Collins 2003, Curtis et al. 2002, German and Hailmichael 2008, Koontz and Thomas 
2006, Koontz et al. 2004, Leach and Pelkey 2001, Michaels 2001, Michaels et al. 2006, 
Santos et al. 2008, Wagner and Fernandez-Gimenez 2008, Wakefield et al. 2007, 13 
 
Woolley and McGinnis 1999). These studies have highlighted the importance of the 
context in which the organizations emerge. Studies of lake associations address similar 
themes, examining formation (Kramer 2007, Kruetwiser 1986) and success (Kramer 
2007, Kruetwiser 1986, Gabriel and Lancaster 2004). 
 
Methods and Data 
 Guided by theoretical expectations reviewed in the previous section, we employed 
regression approaches to investigate the current distribution (presence/absence) and 
management success of Maine lake associations.  We considered the influences of 
resource, community, institutional, and organizational characteristics on organizations' 
presence, management behavior, and management success.  We evaluated success by 
gauging institutional responses to distinct lake management issues: water quality, 
invasive plants, recreation, development, and road maintenance.   
We employed binary probit regression analysis to explain the presence/absence of lake 
associations as a function of resource, community, and institutional characteristics.   We 
estimated ordered probit models to explain variation in management success for a 
subset of lake associations as a function of these characteristics as well as organization 
attributes; we consider water quality, invasive plant, recreation, development, and road 
management issues.  The diversity of these five management issues allows us to 
compare and contrast patterns in management success.   
We estimated a sample selection model that combines the binary probit model of 
presence and the ordered probit model of management and explicitly simulates entry 
into the lake management success sample.  We examined the relative performance of 
empirical econometric models that ignore and address potential sample selection bias.  
Because we only observe measures of lake association management success on lakes 
that have a lake association, the sample is non-random.  In our empirical work, entry into 
the lake association management success sample is further complicated by our reliance 
on survey data to describe management behavior and performance.   When estimating 
the integrated model, we had to drop some lake association presence observations from 
our sample because we did not have management success information for these lakes.  
By relying on a survey of VLMP monitors, we influenced the process of entry into our 14 
 
success sample.  Unmeasured characteristics may be explaining entry into the success 
sample and the stated level of success. 
Following the notation of Greene (2002, p. E18-24), the integrated model can be 
represented as follows: 
Ordered probit model of lake management success 
  
                 
      0                        
      1                        
      2                      
      3                        
where yi* is an unobserved latent measure of the lake association's "true" management 
success on lake i, β are k parameters to be estimated, xi represents k resource (R), 
community (C), institutional (I), and organizational (O) characteristics for lake  i , yi is the 
perceived categorical level of management success, and ε is a random error term.  
 Binary probit model of lake association presence (sample selection equation) 
    
               
       1       
    0       0                              
where  LAi* is an unobserved latent measure of the return from having a lake association 
present on lake i, α are l parameters to be estimated, zi represents l resource (R), 
community (C), and institutional (I) characteristics for lake i,  LAi is our binary description 
of lake association presence, and u is a random error term. 
We only observe success data (SUC) when lake associations are present (LA=1).  This 
specification of sample selection assumes ε and u are random error terms having a 
bivariate standard normal distribution with correlation ρ.  We estimated the integrated 
model using full information maximization likelihood (FIML) techniques.  When the 
estimate of ρ is significantly different from 0, there is support for "selectivity". 
These same expressions can be used to motivate the stand-alone binary probit and 
ordered probit models that overlook sample selection issues.   15 
 
Study Area 
The State of Maine is an appropriate area to study lake associations. Maine’s landscape 
is rich in lakes and ponds, with more than 2,000 Great Ponds (10 acres/40.05 hectares 
or more in area) and countless smaller or seasonal ponds. The State of Maine holds all 
Great Ponds in trust. The Great Ponds Law, a colonial ordinance, guarantees public 
access to Great Ponds for fishing and fowling across unimproved lands (Maine Revised 
Statute Title 17 § 3860).  The Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) 
estimates lakes and ponds cover six percent of Maine's landscape (Maine Department of 
Environmental Protection, 1998).  In addition to providing habitat for plants and animals, 
Maine's lakes and ponds provide drinking water and are a major recreation attraction for 
both residents and visitors to the state.  Research in the late 1990s established that both 
residents and visitors spend a total of $1.087 billion on lake recreation annually (Boyle et 
al., 1997).  This research also estimated the net economic value of Maine’s Great Ponds 
to be $6.7 billion dollars (Boyle et al., 1997). In addition, lakes attract residential 
development. Nearly $350 million is spent on lakefront properties per year (Boyle et al., 
1997).  Maine’s Land Use Regulation Commission (LURC) notes that, within the 
unorganized territories, 46 percent of all building permits are for structures within 500 
feet of a water body (ME LURC, 2007).  
 
Data 
We assembled an extensive spatial database describing natural and human features of 
2,602 Maine lakes (Maine's great ponds; > 10 acres in size) to support this analysis.  
Data describing the distribution and success of lake associations were drawn from non-
government organization, federal and state agency databases and primary survey data 
collected to describe social and economic characteristics of Maine lakes.  We captured 
additional lake and association attributes by manipulating various state and federal GIS 
databases and creating primary spatial databases.  
 
We view the current distribution of lake associations as indicative of past cumulative 
decisions made by communities, where the return from organizational formation is a 
function of physical attributes of the lake resource, community attributes and institutional 
attributes.   Our research of lake association presence (LA) emphasizes several lake 
attributes: lake size (SHORE), threatened environmental quality (IMP), surrounding land 
cover (PAG, PFOR), public recreation access via boat launches (BL); recreational fish 16 
 
(FISH); housing density and housing value (HU and HV); the number of jurisdictions 
bordering a lake (JUR); local employment (NREMP, RECEMP), presence of other lake 
institutions (VLMP), whether or not the lake serves as a drinking water source (DWAT), 
the number of jurisdictions surrounding the lake (JUR), and whether or not the lake is 
located in the unorganized or organized area of Maine (INLURC).   We also examine five 
organizational issues: organization age (AGE), membership size (MEMB), membership 
mix (MYR, MSE), collaborative relationships (CGOV, CSTATE, CNGO) and issue 
attention (ATT).   
 
We employed data collected by the Maine Congress of Lake Associations (COLA) and 
Maine Bureau of Corporations, Elections and Commissions to identify which 
communities have formed lake associations (ME COLA 2009, Computer file available 
online, Maine Bureau of Corporations, Elections and Commissions, Department of the 
Secretary of State. Computer file available online).  The distribution of lake associations 
throughout the state of Maine shows a mixed spatial pattern with more lake associations 
in the populated southern portions of Maine as well as in Maine's "rim" counties (Figure 
1).  As of January 2009, about ten percent of these lakes host some form of local lake 
management organization.  A variety of state and federal data resources provided 
information describing resource, community, and institutional characteristics (see Table 
1 for descriptive statistics).  University of Maine's PEARL database (Senator George J. 
Mitchell Center for Environmental and Watershed Research, University of Maine, 2008, 
PEARL. Computer file available online) and Maine’s Department of Inland Fisheries and 
Wildlife (IF&W) lake data files (Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife, 2008. 
Computer file.) were invaluable sources of information about physical resource 
characteristics.  We calculated the percentage of urban, agricultural and forest land 
cover for each Great Pond’s direct drainage area using the 2001 USGS National Land 
Cover data layer (NLCD 2001).  The US Census Bureau's Census of Population and 
Housing (United States Census Bureau 1990 and 2000 Census. Computer file available 
online) served as the key source of information for community characteristics.  Due to 
data availability, we opted to measure these characteristics at the county subdivision 
level; data reflect values for all county subdivisions bordering the water body.  We 
measured numerous characteristics using ESRI's ArcMap GIS software and opted to 
organize and store our database in GIS format. 
 17 
 
We derived our measures of perceived management success using survey data 
collected by our research team in Spring of 2009.   The survey, designed and 
implemented using Dillman’s (2000) tailored design method, was sent to members of 
Maine’s Volunteer Lake Monitor Program (VLMP). Members of this program collect 
water quality data for more than 350 lakes in Maine and are well trained in scientific 
protocols.  We opportunistically included a number of questions about local 
organizations and lake associations that exist around the lakes these volunteers actively 
monitor.  We pre-tested the survey with members of the VLMP before distributing the 
survey. The survey was sent to 417 lake monitors. The monitors were sent a reminder 
postcard one week following the survey. Another reminder along with a replacement 
survey was sent several weeks later. This resulted in the response rate of 76 percent.  
Of those responding, more than 80 percent (N) reported some sort lake association 
activity.  Merging these organizational data with the Great Ponds data on 
presence/absence of lake associations(n=2,602), we identified about 170 lakes in 
common.  Management success on five issues (WQSUC, IPSUC, RECSUC, DEVSUC, 
RDSUC) is described using an ordinal measure of success; values range from 0 to 3, 
with 3 representing the highest level of management success. 18 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Maine Lake Associations 19 
 
 ORDER  
Resource Characteristics(R) 
Physical characteristics of lakes influence the benefits and costs of lake association formation 
and management for community members. Larger lakes, with more complicated shorelines 
(SHORE) may be more difficult to manage because of increased transaction costs associated 
with management.  Separate intra-communities may form in coves, and a lake association may 
help coordinate the lake management among these groups.   Hence, we expect SHORE to be 
correlated positively with lake association presence and negatively with lake association 
management success. 
 
Natural resource threats, such as an infestation of non-native invasive plants or an impaired 
lake (US EPA 303 d list), can influence the return to local organization formation as well as 
management success.   Community members may have a strong incentive to control the growth 
of an invasive plant infestation because the presence of invasive plants has a negative effect on 
property values and can detract from recreation and scenery (Halstead et al. 2003). Controlling 
invasive plants is an expensive process and property owner groups help share the effort and 
costs. In addition, an infestation may serve as a “crisis” that spurs action. The risk of infestation 
increases if a nearby lake is a known infestation site.  Inclusion on the 303 d list is another 
indication of an environmental problem. This is a list required by the Clean Water Act to report 
lakes that are impaired such that they are not meeting their designated use.  We expect these 
natural impairments (IMP) to be correlated positively with lake association presence. 
 
The surrounding land cover in the direct drainage may influence the lake’s water quality. 
Agricultural (PAG) land cover is typically associated with decreases in water quality because of 
nonpoint source pollution (US EPA 305 b report 2000).  Accordingly, we expect PAG to be 
correlated positively with lake association presence.  While forest harvesting can also cause 
nonpoint source pollution, we have mixed expectations about forest land cover (PFOR) because 
forests also act as natural buffers. The knowledge that a lake is impaired or at risk may motivate 
citizens to work to improve the water quality (Lubell 2004).  In this context, lake association 
formation can be viewed as responding to a gap in existing and past lake management 
approaches. 
  
Popular recreation lakes are a valuable resource that the community may want to preserve 
(Boyle et al. 1997, Schuetz et al. 2001). Boat launches (BL) ease public access to a lake for 20 
 
boating, fishing and other recreational activities.  Fishing for bass or cold-water species such as 
trout and land locked salmon is a popular pass time in Maine.  Lakes with strong fisheries 
(FISH) may be valued by a community as a recreational resource. Lake associations may form 
to protect water quality, habitat or lobby for stocking.  Communities may form lake associations 
to protect a popular recreation site.  Accordingly, we expect BL and FISH to be correlated 
positively with lake association presence.  We have mixed expectations about the correlation 
between BL and FISH and management success because public access and values of a lake 
resource can complicate local management of lake management issues. 
 
Community Characteristics(C) 
Community Characteristics, including demographic and geographic factors, may encourage or 
discourage the formation and success of lake associations. Increased population and more 
frequent use can increase transaction costs by slowing the spread of information and contribute 
to the heterogeneity of the community.  Such a lake may also be valued by a larger group of 
people who may work to protect its water quality.  Due to the large population of seasonal 
residents, we use housing unit density (HUD), instead of population density, as a measure of 
community size.  We have uncertain expectations regarding the correlations between HUD and 
lake association presence and success.  The median housing value (HUV) in a community 
could contribute to lake association formation and success because a lakeside home is a 
significant asset. Property owners are motivated to protect the value of their homes by 
protecting the water quality of a lake and the recreational experiences it supports. Therefore, we 
expect HUV to be correlated positively with lake association presence and management 
success. 
 
Lake-based recreation plays an important role in the economy lakeside communities (Boyle et al 
1997, Schuetz et al 2001).  If the quality of the lake declined to a point that discouraged visitors, 
these communities would experience an economic decline.  Therefore, community members 
have an incentive to maintain the quality of recreation opportunities.  US Census data allowed 
us to calculate the percentage of the population employed in recreation accommodation or food 
service industries (RECEMP), and measure the town’s economic dependence on recreation.  
We also include the natural resource employment (NREMP) to test the hypothesis about a 
resistance to increased environmental regulation. Areas dependent on agriculture, forestry or 
other natural resource-based industries may be resistant to increased regulation or policy 21 
 
changes designed to protect water quality, which may be costly to implement.  Accordingly, we 
expect these employment measures to be correlated negatively with association presence. 
 
Institutional Characteristics 
Laws, beliefs and a community’s culture also influence the formation of organizations. A past 
history of local level organization is a strong predictor of subsequent organization formation 
because these organizations increase social capital, connections and similar beliefs between 
community members (Coleman 1988, Woolcook 1998, Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 1999 Ostrom 
2005). Maine’s Volunteer Lake Monitoring Program (VLMP) has collected water quality data for 
Maine’s lakes since the 1970s.  Participation in the volunteer lake monitoring program may 
indicate that the community has a tradition of local level management.  
 
Lakes often cross a number of jurisdictional boundaries, which may increases transaction costs 
associated with lake management because management must be coordinated across 
boundaries and at a number of levels.  Lake associations may reduce these transaction costs 
by aiding communication.  If a lake is surrounded by more than 1 jurisdiction (JUR), we expect a 
higher chance of lake association presence.  In contrast because of transaction costs, we 
expect JUR to be correlated negatively with lake management success. 
 
The Land Use Regulation Commission (LURC) is responsible for land use planning in the 
unorganized territories of Maine.  LURC has defined a number of restrictive zones around Great 
Ponds (LURC) that limit access, development and uses of lands.  As a result, lake associations 
may be viewed as unnecessary on Great Ponds regulated by these policies (INLURC) because 
LURC’s zoning and regulations are sufficient to protect lake quality. Statewide, more than 100 
Great Ponds serve as a community’s drinking water source (DWAT).  These lakes are 
especially valuable resources and towns may have taken additional measures to protect the 
water quality. As a result, community members may feel that this resource is adequately 




Research shows that organizations that collaborate with other organizations create social 
capital and are more likely to successfully address lake management issues (Gabriel and 
Lancaster 2004, Lubell 2004, Kramer 2007).  Agencies can provide professional support 22 
 
(CSTATE, CGOV) and other organizations, including land trusts and sporting groups (CNGO), 
often have similar goals, which could benefit from collaboration.  We expect these binary 
measures of successful collaboration to be correlated positively with lake management success. 
 
Membership size of an organization (MEMB) is associated with success of an organization 
(Kramer 2007, Ostrom 1990). Work is divided among more people, which prevents the fatigue 
of volunteers.  In addition more social capital is created when more people work together for a 
common goal.  The age (AGE) of an organization can be an indicator of how established the 
organization is in the community.   The longer an organization has existed, the greater a chance 
it has developed social capital within the community. Social capital is a key element in the 
success of associations (Leach and Sabitier 2005).  The makeup of the organization can also 
influence the success of the organization (Lubell et al. 2002, Sabatier 2005). A lake association 
made up of mostly seasonal residents may have difficulty integrating into the larger community 
and changing behaviors of nonmembers. A heterogeneous group may face more challenges 
than a group made up of mostly seasonal residents or mostly year-round residents in 
addressing road issues because the needs of the two groups are drastically different.  MSE and 
MYR are dummy variables that indicate if the lake association is made up of mostly seasonal or 
mostly year-round residents. This is compared to an even mix of both groups, the left-out 
category in the regression analysis.  
 
The amount of attention (ATT) an association places on an issue can have a strong influence on 
the amount of success the association has addressing that issue because the association 
commits time and resources to the problem (Lubell et al. 2002, Leach and Pelkey 2001).   We 
expect these binary measures of focus (WQATT, IPATT, RECATT, DEVATT, RDATT) to be 
correlated postively with lake management success. 
 
Methods 
We tested the relevancy of the IAD framework to explain the distribution and success of lake 
associations on Maine's Great Ponds using discrete regression analyses.  We began by 
estimating a binary probit model of lake association presence/absence (Table 2).  We also 
estimated ordered probit models of lake management success (Table 3).  To explore the utility 
of the integrated model incorporating selection, we also estimated the selection model that 
integrates the two previous models (Table 4).  We used LIMDEP software to estimate these 
models.  Parameters (β and α) were estimated using maximum likelihood methods.    23 
 
 
We evaluated different specifications of the models by comparing goodness of fit measures 
across specifications, including the likelihood value, information criteria (AIC and BIC) and 
McFadden Pseudo R
2.  We examined the data to detect multicollinearity problems.  Pair-wise 
correlation tests and variance inflation factors were used to identify possible multicollinearity 
problems.  We dropped some potential explanatory variables from our analysis in response to 
these problems (e.g., seasonal housing and percent urban land cover in the drainage).  
 
 Results  
Overall, the results of our proposed empirical modeling are encouraging (Tables 2-4).   As noted 
in the introduction, we are most optimistic about the presence/absence formation findings (Table 
2).  By employing data describing Maine's Great Ponds (n=2,602), we were able to work with a 
diverse set of lake resources and lake associations.   Examined separately, parameters 
associated with the variables describing resource characteristics and institutional characteristics 
are significant at the 0.10 level (these parameters are shaded in light blue in Table 2).   
 
Of the factors associated with resource characteristics, the presence of a natural impairment 
(IMP), percent of drainage in agricultural and forest land cover (PAG, PFOR), number of public 
boat launches (BL), and presence of a bass or cold-water fishery (FISH) have parameters that 
are significant at the 0.10 level.  IMP, BL, and FISH are positively correlated with lake 
association presence, suggesting lake associations are responsive to crises and form to protect 
valued recreational assets.  PAG and PFOR are negatively correlated with lake association 
presence relative to other land covers.  These results may indicate a lesser need for lake 
associations in more remote areas with less development.  These are consistent with our 
expectations and past research (Lubell 2002, Kramer 2007).   
 
Parameters associated with three of the institutional factors are significant at the 0.10 level.   
The parameters associated with VLMP and JUR have the expected positive sign.  Theory 
suggests that areas with a history of local level organizations are more likely to form other 
organizations. In this case lake associations and volunteer lake monitoring (VLMP) seem to be 
correlated. The positive sign of JUR suggests that lake associations can help reduce transaction 
costs associated with managing a resource that crosses multiple political jurisdictions. Lake 
associations might help coordinate between government officials. The parameter associated 
with INLURC is significant at the 0.10 level also with a negative sign. In this case, the negative 24 
 
correlation with lake association presence suggests lake associations are less relevant in the 
unorganized region of Maine.  This could be explained by successful regional lake management 
plans in place by LURC or be a function of the more remote characteristics of this region. 
 
None of the community characteristics are correlated with lake association presence at the 0.10 
significance level.  We remain concerned about correlations across these characteristics and 
other independent variables. 
 
Our empirical findings regarding lake management success are less encouraging (Tables 3 and 
4).  We view these as preliminary findings because of the small sample size and general 
statistical performance of these models.  The strongest result of the stand-alone ordered probit 
models is the consistent positive correlation between a lake association's focus (or level of 
attention; ATT) on an issue and its management success.    
 
Resource characteristics explain some variation in management success.  A more extensive 
shoreline (SHORE) is negatively correlated with recreation management success.  This finding 
is consistent with prior research showing larger, more dispersed resources are more difficult to 
manage.  Hosting key recreational fish species (FISH) is negatively correlated with successful 
management of road issues.   Excessive public use of local lake roads could explain this finding.   
 
Community characteristics also explain some variation in management success.  Higher median 
housing values (HV) are positively correlated with successful management of invasive plants; 
higher housing unit densities (HUD) are positively correlated with successful management of 
road issues. Communities with higher housing values have more to lose from an invasive plant 
infestation.  Similarly, communities with greater housing densities have more to gain from 
maintained roads and may be more likely to have public roads near lakes; more densely settled 
communities on private lake roads would face higher transaction costs and greater free-riding.   
 
Organizational/institutional characteristics help explain variation in management success. 
Membership dominated by seasonal residents (MSE), relative to an equal balance of seasonal 
and year-round residents, is correlated negatively with water quality management success.  
Water quality problems may demand year-round attention or water quality be more highly 
valued by year-round residents.  Successful collaboration is positively associated with lake 
management success - successful collaboration with local town government or LURC (CGOV) 25 
 
is positively correlated with successful management of recreation and road maintenance issues; 
successful collaboration with state government agencies (CSTATE) is positively correlated with 
management of water quality issues; and successful collaboration with land trusts or sporting 
groups (CNGO) is positively correlated with management of development-related lake 
management issues.  These findings are somewhat consistent with the focus of these 
respective groups.  As noted above, the clearest pattern (Table 3) across the 5 distinct 
management issues is the positive correlation between attention/focus and management 
success. 
 
The results of our joint modeling (Greene 2002) treating presence as a form of selection into the 
management success sample  (Tables 4A-4E) offer no support for this integrated modeling 
approach.  In all cases, the selection parameter (ρ ) is not significantly different from 0.  
Because of the small sample size and source of the success data, we remain interested in 
testing this joint modeling approach.  Having worked through this model, we are now open to 
collecting improved, comprehensive data and conducting additional empirical testing in the 
future.     
 
Limitations 
There are several key limitations of this research, mostly related to regression analysis and data 
availability. These can be broken down into three categories: regression analysis, issues of 
timing, and issues of scale.   
 
The usual caveats of regression analysis apply.  Correlation does not imply causation.  In 
addition, factors associated with the existence of lake associations are not necessarily 
correlated with the formation of an association.  These data are a snapshot of lake associations 
as of 2009.  We know little about the individual histories of the associations, and this data would 
be difficult to incorporate in this model.   We rely on surveys of citizen science monitors to 
characterize lake association behavior and attributes.  These data represent the view of a single 
individual and do not capture all Great Ponds with a lake association.   As a result, we were not 
able to make full use of the lake data; only 170 lakes were in both the presence/absence and 
success databases.  Approximately, 269 lake associations are present on Maine's Great Ponds; 
our analysis missed 100 lake associations. 
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Temporal data could better capture whether a lake association formed after a particular 
environmental crisis, for example a particularly bad algae bloom or the discovery of an invasive 
species outbreak, or the extent to which management success varies over time.   
Many community variables were measured at the county subdivision scale. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that lakeside property owners make up much of the lake association membership, 
which suggests that ideally a smaller level of analysis would be more accurate. This limitation 
may account for the small number of significant parameters associated with community 
variables. Furthermore, this research does not address the importance of a strong individual 
community leader.   
  
Conclusions 
We find little support for our integrated model incorporating selection, where lake association 
presence determines entry into a model of lake management success.  Yet, we hope to do 
additional testing of this approach and other alternatives for integrating these models using an 
improved dataset in the future. 
 
We find Ostrom's IAD theoretical framework to be a useful means of describing factors 
influencing the formation (presence/absence) of lake associations.   
Constrained by limited data on the management success of lake associations, we advance only 
preliminary findings.  However, we remain interested in our joint modeling approach and look 
forward to further research of the behavior of these local institutions. 
Our research of Maine lake associations strives to offer guidance on how to better integrate the 
informal approaches of local institutions with more formal, regional government-based 
management approaches. Our findings related to the presence of lake associations have 
several policy implications.  First, understanding where and why lake associations form is an 
important step to understanding what makes lake associations successful. In addition, these 
associations could play a greater role in lake management if there were stronger ties between 
local-, state-, and regional- scale organizations.  Formal and informal organizations are well 
suited to complement each other. While state and local governments are better able to address 
enforcement, informal organizations are well suited to develop personal relationships, spread 
information, and change behaviors.  By understanding where lake associations are likely to 
form, government agencies and other stakeholder groups are likely to form stronger 27 
 
relationships with lake associations, and even delegate some management tasks to lake 
associations.  
This research extended recent thesis research at University of Maine (Snell 2009).  Together, 
these studies offer guidance for future research.  Future work will include gathering additional 
data on lake association success and management activities, testing of spatial aspects of local 
institutions include potential network effects from nearby associations and interactive effects 
due to the spread of risks and problems over space (e.g., invasive plants and fish), and 
consideration of more advanced econometric approaches. 
  28 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Maine Lake Associations; 2009) 
Variable Category  N  Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum Maximum 
Formation(Presence or Absence)  
LA    2602 0.103 0.305 0.000 1.000 
SHORE  R  2602 22.973  58.050 2.476  1482.590 
IMPAIR  R  2602 0.043 0.204 0.000 1.000 
PAG  R  2602 2.594 7.219 0.000  90.431 
PFOR  R  2602  75.162 15.056  0.000 100.000 
BL  R  2602 0.088 0.327 0.000 6.000 
FISH  R  2602 0.553 0.497 0.000 1.000 
HUD  C  2602  17.415 30.968  0.118 468.363 
HUV  C  2602 8.193 3.668 0.000  32.500 
NREMP  C  2602 0.527 0.830 0.000  18.077 
RECEMP  C  2602 0.866 1.206 0.000  18.556 
VLMP  I  2602 0.146 0.353 0.000 1.000 
DWAT  I  2602 0.041 0.199 0.000 1.000 
JUR  I  2602 0.147 0.354 0.000 1.000 
INLURC  I  2602 0.473 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Management Success 
WQSUC   133  2.022556  0.891595  0 3 
IPSUC   130  1.984615  0.923296  0  3 
RECSUC   132  1.409091  0.80033  0  3 
DEVSUC   123  1.235772 0.820649  0  3 
RDSUC   137  1.394161  0.834528  0 3 
SHORE  R  172  72.60023 99.24162 5.164861 691.3834 
BL R  172  0.523256  0.65296  0  3 
FISH R  172  0.947674  0.223333  0  1 
HUD C  172  35.93446  43.97558  0.601511  468.363 
HUV C  172  9.568701  2.406642  2.375  20.54 
JUR I  172  0.540698  0.499796  0  1 
AGE O  172  34.32025  17.10884  2  101 
MEMB O  163  37.29908  29.49218  1  250 
MYR O  172  0.185078  0.378281  0  1 
MSE O  172  0.449128  0.48503  0  1 
CGOV O  172  0.80814  0.394914  0  1 
CSTATE O  172  0.581395  0.494771  0  1 
CNGO O  172  0.482558  0.501155  0  1 
WQATT O  172  0.906977  0.291313  0  1 
IPATT O  172  0.80814  0.394914  0  1 
RECATT O  170  0.670588  0.471388  0  1 
DEVLATT O  170  0.617647  0.487398  0  1 
RDATT O  172  0.697674  0.460607  0 1 36 
 
Table 2: Binary Probit Model of Maine Lake Association Formation (Presence or Absence 
of Lake Association 2009) 
Variable  Parameter  Standard  Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Estimate Error 
Intercept  -1.7651  0.3509  -2.4529  <.0001 
SHORE  -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0013 0.9278 
IMPAIR  0.6348  0.1621  0.3171  <.0001 
PAG  -0.0254  0.011  -0.047  0.0214 
PFOR  -0.008  0.0039  -0.0157  0.0419 
BL  0.2675  0.1158  0.0405  0.0209 
FISH  0.5935  0.1202  0.358  <.0001 
HUD 0.0008  0.0015  -0.0022  0.586 
HUV 0.0162  0.014  -0.0113  0.2491 
NREMP 0.0484  0.0564  -0.0622  0.3909 
RECEMP 0.0225 0.0365 -0.0491 0.5386 
VLMP  1.494  0.1049  1.2885  <.0001 
DWAT  -0.2847 0.1938 -0.6645 0.1417 
JUR  0.3951  0.1165  0.1668  0.0007 
INLURC  -0.4438  0.1199  -0.6787  0.0002 
 
N=2,602; LnL=-456.4505; Restricted LnL=-865.0378 
AIC=0.3631; BIC=0.3992; McFadden R
2=0.4723;  
Global Chi-square (817.1745) and Pr (<0.0001) 
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Table 3: Ordered Probit Models of Lake Association Success (SUC=3,2,1, and 0) 
WQSUC IPSUC RECSUC  DEVSUC  RDSUC 
Parameter Estimate  Pr > ChiSq  Estimate  Pr > ChiSq  Estimate  Pr > ChiSq  Estimate  Pr > ChiSq  Estimate  Pr > ChiSq 
Constant  ‐0.200  0.781 ‐ 0.811  0.273  -0.038 0.954 -0.315 0.654 0.887 0.203 
SHOR  0.001  0.509 ‐ 0.001  0.538  -0.004  0.009 0.000 0.859 -0.001 0.348 
BL  ‐0.105  0.523  0.092  0.622  0.271 0.142 0.038 0.847 -0.051 0.785 
FISH  0.301  0.553  0.008  0.989  -0.140 0.761 -0.163 0.742 -1.227  0.009 
HUD  0.000  0.954  0.000  0.916  -0.001 0.584 0.001 0.740 0.004  0.068 
HUV  0.033  0.466  0.098  0.051  0.073 0.110 0.076 0.112 -0.037 0.464 
JUR  ‐0.024  0.918 ‐ 0.108  0.641  0.046 0.833 -0.055 0.814 0.227 0.286 
AGE  0.007  0.281  0.002  0.772  -0.003 0.690 -0.005 0.409 0.009 0.160 
MEMB  0.001  0.259  0.000  0.574  -0.001 0.133  -.00008  0.867 0.000 0.591 
MYR  ‐0.464  0.130 ‐ 0.307  0.322  0.092 0.769 0.106 0.733 -0.178 0.565 
MSE  ‐0.415  0.086 ‐ 0.019  0.936  0.191 0.421 -0.042 0.861 0.208 0.392 
CGOV  0.389  0.151  0.408  0.152  0.556  0.047 0.176 0.545 0.603  0.028 
CSTATE  0.506  0.026  0.302  0.180  0.095 0.667 0.216 0.362 0.119 0.588 
CNGO  ‐0.008  0.970  0.279  0.216  0.218 0.308 0.421  0.059 -0.136 0.529 
ATT  0.773  0.063  1.333  <.0001  0.658  0.004  0.642  0.008  1.163  <.0001 
Mu(1)  0.764  <.0001  1.245  <.0001  1.678  <.0001  1.480  <.0001  1.335  <.0001 

















AIC=2.41 -143.089 AIC=2.43  -141.17 AIC=2.39 -140.86 AIC=2.47 -135.03 AIC=2.37 -145.48 
BIC=2.78 RLnL= BIC=2.81 RLnL= BIC=2.76 RLnL= BIC=2.86 RLnL= BIC=2.73 RLnL= 




Table 4A: FIML Selection Model (Probit and Ordered Probit) - Lake Association Formation and 
Association Success at Managing Water Quality Issues 
Variable Estimate  Standard  b/St.Er.  Pr[Z>z] 
Error 
Constant  0.330 0.999 0.331 0.741 
SHORE  0.001 0.001 0.505 0.614 
BL  -0.154 0.205 -0.751 0.453 
FISH  0.201 0.684 0.295 0.768 
HUD  0.000 0.004 -0.066 0.947 
HUV  0.032 0.038 0.825 0.409 
JUR  -0.068 0.241 -0.283 0.777 
AGE  0.005 0.007 0.651 0.515 
MEMB  0.000 0.001 0.959 0.338 
MYR  -0.450 0.348 -1.292 0.197 
MSE  -0.368 0.263 -1.396 0.163 
CGOV 0.414 0.319 1.299 0.194 
CSTATE  0.497 0.256 1.944 0.052 
CNGO  -0.027 0.288 -0.095 0.924 
ATT  0.641 0.391 1.637 0.102 
Mu(1) 0.755  0.197 3.832  <0.0001 
Mu(2) 2.161  0.240 8.988  <0.0001 
Constant  -2.184 0.677 -3.224 0.001 
SHORE  -0.001 0.001 -1.268 0.205 
IMPAIR  0.439 0.243 1.809 0.070 
PAG  -0.043 0.024 -1.779 0.075 
PFOR -0.016 0.007 -2.333 0.020 
BL  0.428 0.171 2.498 0.013 
FISH  0.852 0.278 3.069 0.002 
HUD  0.001 0.002 0.369 0.712 
HUV  0.022 0.033 0.666 0.506 
NREMP  0.175 0.127 1.378 0.168 
RECEMP  -0.021 0.070 -0.294 0.769 
VLMP 1.977  0.182  10.868  <0.0001 
DWAT -0.494 0.255 -1.937 0.053 
JUR  0.322 0.180 1.788 0.074 
INLURC  -0.829 0.260 -3.184 0.002 
ρ(u,e) -0.249 0.308 -0.808 0.419 
N=2,466; LnL=-351.3057; Restricted LnL=-351.3340 
AIC=0.3117; BIC=0.3894 39 
 
Table 4B: FIML Selection Model (Probit and Ordered Probit) - Lake Association Formation and 
Association Success at Managing Invasive Plants 
Variable Estimate  Standard  b/St.Er.  Pr[Z>z] 
Error 
Constant  -0.452 1.503 -0.300 0.764 
SHORE  -0.001 0.002 -0.481 0.631 
BL  0.044 0.254 0.174 0.862 
FISH  -0.085 0.942 -0.090 0.928 
HUD  0.000 0.005 -0.086 0.931 
HUV  0.095 0.066 1.436 0.151 
JUR  -0.140 0.244 -0.574 0.566 
AGE  0.001 0.007 0.143 0.887 
MEMB  0.000 0.001 0.487 0.626 
MYR  -0.304 0.328 -0.926 0.354 
MSE  -0.002 0.248 -0.008 0.994 
CGOV 0.412 0.340 1.213 0.225 
CSTATE  0.291 0.253 1.150 0.250 
CNGO  0.266 0.249 1.071 0.284 
ATT  1.277 0.441 2.894 0.004 
Mu(1) 1.238  0.275 4.505  <0.0001 
Mu(2) 2.369  0.315 7.509  <0.0001 
Constant  -2.276 0.715 -3.183 0.002 
SHORE  -0.001 0.001 -1.504 0.133 
IMPAIR  0.426 0.249 1.708 0.088 
PAG  -0.035 0.024 -1.432 0.152 
PFOR -0.015 0.007 -2.273 0.023 
BL  0.495 0.178 2.775 0.006 
FISH  0.875 0.276 3.166 0.002 
HUD  0.001 0.002 0.638 0.524 
HUV  0.024 0.037 0.641 0.521 
NREMP  0.155 0.129 1.200 0.230 
RECEMP  0.003 0.066 0.052 0.959 
VLMP 1.867  0.185  10.076  <0.0001 
DWAT -0.397 0.248 -1.599 0.110 
JUR  0.399 0.185 2.157 0.031 
INLURC  -0.757 0.265 -2.854 0.004 
ρ(u,e) -0.137 0.303 -0.452 0.651 




Table 4C: FIML Selection Model (Probit and Ordered Probit) - Lake Association Formation and 
Association Success at Managing Recreation Issues 
Variable Estimate  Standard  b/St.Er.  Pr[Z>z] 
Error 
Constant  -0.116 1.008 -0.116 0.908 
SHORE  -0.004 0.002 -1.990 0.047 
BL  0.282 0.264 1.069 0.285 
FISH  -0.122 0.557 -0.219 0.827 
HUD  -0.001 0.006 -0.194 0.846 
HUV  0.073 0.059 1.249 0.212 
JUR  0.057 0.265 0.215 0.830 
AGE  -0.002 0.008 -0.307 0.759 
MEMB  -0.001 0.001 -0.787 0.431 
MYR  0.091 0.461 0.198 0.843 
MSE  0.185 0.261 0.709 0.479 
CGOV 0.554 0.322 1.719 0.086 
CSTATE  0.099 0.233 0.425 0.671 
CNGO  0.222 0.251 0.886 0.376 
ATT  0.660 0.274 2.413 0.016 
Mu(1) 1.678  0.203 8.276  <.0001 
Mu(2) 2.931  0.239  12.272  <.0001 
Constant  -2.481 0.712 -3.485 0.001 
SHORE  -0.001 0.001 -0.991 0.322 
IMPAIR  0.503 0.241 2.087 0.037 
PAG  -0.032 0.024 -1.335 0.182 
PFOR -0.011 0.007 -1.630 0.103 
BL  0.391 0.170 2.302 0.021 
FISH  0.738 0.288 2.558 0.011 
HUD  0.001 0.002 0.340 0.734 
HUV  0.029 0.035 0.812 0.417 
NREMP  0.189 0.113 1.678 0.093 
RECEMP  -0.015 0.064 -0.231 0.817 
VLMP 1.944  0.184  10.591  <.0001 
DWAT -0.384 0.249 -1.546 0.122 
JUR  0.363 0.176 2.057 0.040 
INLURC  -0.855 0.255 -3.357 0.001 
ρ(u,e) 0.038 0.331 0.115 0.909 




Table 4D: FIML Selection Model (Probit and Ordered Probit) - Lake Association Formation and 
Association Success at Managing Development Issues 
Variable Estimate  Standard  b/St.Er.  Pr[Z>z] 
Error 
Constant  -0.719 1.272 -0.565 0.572 
SHORE  0.000 0.002 -0.199 0.842 
BL  0.098 0.235 0.417 0.677 
FISH  -0.056 0.928 -0.060 0.952 
HUD  0.001 0.006 0.167 0.867 
HUV  0.080 0.052 1.524 0.127 
JUR  -0.011 0.272 -0.041 0.967 
AGE  -0.004 0.007 -0.638 0.523 
MEMB  -0.00006  0.001 -0.110 0.913 
MYR  0.093 0.361 0.258 0.796 
MSE  -0.064 0.312 -0.205 0.838 
CGOV 0.174 0.343 0.507 0.612 
CSTATE  0.246 0.275 0.896 0.370 
CNGO  0.437 0.279 1.563 0.118 
ATT  0.651 0.296 2.198 0.028 
Mu(1) 1.473  0.197 7.470  <.0001 
Mu(2) 2.701  0.304 8.896  <.0001 
Constant  -2.360 0.732 -3.224 0.001 
SHORE  -0.001 0.001 -1.081 0.280 
IMPAIR  0.534 0.249 2.143 0.032 
PAG  -0.034 0.024 -1.427 0.154 
PFOR -0.012 0.007 -1.717 0.086 
BL  0.416 0.178 2.338 0.019 
FISH  0.752 0.279 2.698 0.007 
HUD  0.001 0.002 0.451 0.652 
HUV  0.014 0.036 0.392 0.695 
NREMP  0.209 0.127 1.651 0.099 
RECEMP  -0.013 0.068 -0.197 0.844 
VLMP 1.922  0.189  10.159  <0.001 
DWAT -0.345 0.249 -1.383 0.167 
JUR  0.339 0.194 1.747 0.081 
INLURC  -0.835 0.282 -2.962 0.003 
ρ(u,e) 0.171 0.298 0.575 0.565 





Table 4E: FIML Selection Model (Probit and Ordered Probit) - Lake Association Formation and 
Association Success at Managing Road Issues 
Variable Estimate  Standard  b/St.Er.  Pr[Z>z] 
Error 
Constant  0.743 0.979 0.759 0.448 
SHORE  -0.001 0.002 -0.858 0.391 
BL  -0.031 0.256 -0.119 0.905 
FISH  -1.195 0.568 -2.103 0.036 
HUD  0.004 0.005 0.940 0.347 
HUV  -0.036 0.076 -0.468 0.640 
JUR  0.245 0.258 0.951 0.341 
AGE  0.009 0.007 1.227 0.220 
MEMB -0.0002  0.0004  -0.560  0.575 
MYR  -0.183 0.407 -0.449 0.653 
MSE  0.196 0.326 0.603 0.547 
CGOV 0.605 0.296 2.045 0.041 
CSTATE  0.124 0.219 0.568 0.570 
CNGO  -0.129 0.263 -0.492 0.623 
ATT 1.166  0.258  4.523  <.0001 
Mu(1) 1.333  0.190 7.002  <.0001 
Mu(2) 2.932  0.249  11.775  <.0001 
Constant  -2.210 0.683 -3.236 0.001 
SHORE  -0.001 0.001 -1.257 0.209 
IMPAIR  0.477 0.253 1.889 0.059 
PAG  -0.044 0.025 -1.729 0.084 
PFOR -0.014 0.007 -2.110 0.035 
BL  0.367 0.163 2.254 0.024 
FISH  0.774 0.267 2.903 0.004 
HUD  0.001 0.003 0.441 0.659 
HUV  0.018 0.034 0.530 0.596 
NREMP  0.187 0.129 1.444 0.149 
RECEMP  -0.011 0.067 -0.165 0.869 
VLMP 1.961  0.170  11.531  <.0001 
DWAT -0.389 0.252 -1.542 0.123 
JUR  0.391 0.181 2.161 0.031 
INLURC  -0.727 0.243 -2.995 0.003 
ρ(u,e) 0.066 0.325 0.205 0.838 
N=2,470; LnL=-362.5185; Restricted LnL=-362.5657;  
AIC=0.3203; BIC=0.3979 
 